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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-99-cr-00776-001) 
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova 
___________ 
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Before: SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.* 
 
(Filed: August 17, 2016) 
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Brett G. Sweitzer 
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Federal Community Defender Office  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
  Counsel for Appellant 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
                                                 
* The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter assumed inactive 
status on April 4, 2016, after the submission date of this case, 
but before filing of the opinion. This opinion is filed by a 
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third 
Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 After serving a fifteen-year federal prison sentence for 
being an armed career criminal who unlawfully possessed a 
firearm, Appellant Jermaine Jones was released to serve a 
five-year period of supervised release. A year later, he was 
arrested on drug charges. In response to this arrest, the 
District Court revoked Jones’s supervised release and 
sentenced him to an additional forty months in prison. In this 
appeal, Jones argues that his sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum because his crime of conviction should have been 
deemed a Class C felony instead of a Class A felony under 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.     
I 
 In April 1999, a Norristown, Pennsylvania police 
officer approached Jones as he drank a beer on a public 
sidewalk in violation of a local ordinance. Jones fled, but was 
apprehended by police who discovered a gun in the area and 
concluded that Jones had discarded it. Jones was indicted 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) and charged with 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In June 2000, 
Jones was found guilty by a jury.  
The Government sought to have Jones sentenced under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which requires a 
sentence of at least 180 months for anyone convicted under § 
922(g) who has three or more predicate convictions for either 
a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e). The Government argued that Jones had amassed four 
predicate offenses: a robbery conviction, an aggravated 
assault conviction, and two controlled substances convictions. 
Over objection, the District Court agreed that ACCA applied 
 4 
 
and imposed the statutory mandatory minimum plus five 
years’ supervised release. We affirmed Jones’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal, United States v. 
Jones, 48 F. App’x 835 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam), and the 
District Court denied habeas relief, Jones v. United States, 
2000 WL 34075804 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2003). 
Jones was released from federal custody on October 9, 
2013. A little over a year later, his probation officer reported 
that Jones had been arrested on state drug charges. After 
holding several hearings, the District Court determined that 
Jones had violated the terms of his supervised release and 
decided to revoke supervision and order him returned to 
prison.  
In March 2015, the District Court held a hearing to 
determine the length of Jones’s sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3), the maximum permissible revocation sentence 
depends on the classification of “the offense that resulted in 
the term of supervised release.” The Government argued that 
Jones’s underlying offense is a Class A felony, which 
authorized a maximum revocation sentence of five years’ 
imprisonment. Relying on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2151 (2013), Jones countered that he was subject to no more 
than two years’ imprisonment because his offense is properly 
categorized as a Class C felony.  
The District Court rejected Jones’s argument as an 
attempt to apply Alleyne retroactively and classified his 
offense a Class A felony. After granting a downward 
departure, the Court imposed a revocation sentence of forty 
months’ imprisonment. Jones appealed.  
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II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3231 and 3583. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
 The parties dispute our standard of review. The crux of 
their disagreement is whether Jones preserved the argument 
he advances on appeal by raising it in the District Court. 
Although we take this opportunity to reemphasize the 
responsibility of litigants to raise not just all “issues” but all 
“arguments” in district court, United States v. Joseph, 730 
F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013), we need not determine whether 
Jones met that responsibility in this case. Because we would 
reach the same result under either standard of review, we will 
apply de novo review, which is more favorable to Jones. 
United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(applying de novo review in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3583).   
III 
 Several of our sister courts have held that “the validity 
of an underlying conviction or sentence may not be 
collaterally attacked in a supervised release revocation 
proceeding and may be challenged only on direct appeal or 
through a habeas corpus proceeding.” United States v. 
Warren, 335 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United 
States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827, 828–29 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 363 (11th Cir. 
1996) (per curiam). We join those courts today.  
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 Jones tries to escape this straightforward rule by 
arguing that his appeal “does not challenge the validity of 
[his] underlying conviction or sentence.” Reply Br. 6. He 
characterizes his case as a challenge to “only the district 
court’s determination, at revocation sentencing, that his 
underlying offense is presently classified as a Class A felony 
for Section 3583(e) purposes.” Id. In other words, Jones 
argues that he is appealing an error the Court made in 
calculating his revocation sentence rather than collaterally 
attacking his original conviction or sentence. We disagree 
with this characterization. 
 In light of Jones’s drug charges, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) 
authorized the District Court to “revoke [his] term of 
supervised release” and “require [him] to serve in prison all 
or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute 
for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 
release.” 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added). The offense 
that resulted in Jones’s five-year term of supervised release 
was unlawful possession of a firearm by an armed career 
criminal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). 
Jones acknowledges, as he must, that this offense was 
properly classified as a Class A felony at the time of his 
original conviction and sentencing. He nonetheless argues 
that two recent Supreme Court cases—Johnson v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) and Johnson v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 2551 (2015)—nullify his status as an armed career 
criminal and render the “present[] classifi[cation]” of his 
offense a Class C felony. Reply Br. 6. 
 Even if Jones were correct that his original offense 
would not include an armed career criminal designation under 
current law, it would have no effect on his revocation 
sentence because the District Court is not tasked under 
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Section 3583(e) with reconsidering an offender’s status as an 
armed career criminal.1 That determination was made in 
2001, and was proper at that time. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); 
Williams, 675 F.3d at 279 (“[The] language [of Section 
3583(e)(3)] unambiguously sets the maximum prison 
sentence by reference to the length of supervised release 
statutorily authorized for the conviction offense . . . .”). This 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement that 
revocation sentences are part and parcel of a defendant’s 
underlying conviction and punishment. Johnson v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (“[P]ostrevocation sanctions 
[are properly considered] as part of the penalty for the initial 
offense . . . .”); see also United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 
239, 241 (3d Cir. 1997) (“A sentence imposed upon 
revocation of supervised release is most properly viewed as a 
consequence of the original criminal conviction.”).  
 For these reasons, we reject Jones’s efforts to bifurcate 
his original conviction and sentence from his revocation 
sentence, and to characterize this appeal as a direct challenge 
to a classification determination made in imposing the latter. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
                                                 
1 Our decision in United States v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 
425 (3d Cir. 2012) does not support Jones’s argument. There, 
we held that the classification of Appellant’s original 
conviction was not subject to change under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e) based on a statutory amendment. Those 
circumstances are not present here and we decline Jones’s 
invitation to apply Turlington by negative implication. 
